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Who Watches the Watchmen's Tape?
FOIA's Categorical Exemptions and
Police Body-Worn Cameras
Joseph Wennert

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 10, 2015, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley signed a
bill requiring all state and local law enforcement officers to wear body
cameras.' Surrounded by the family of Walter Scott-a black man who
had been shot and killed by a North Charleston police officer two
months earlier-Governor Haley said the measure "is going to make
sure Walter Scott did not die without us realizing that we have a
problem." 2 Policy-makers largely praised the law as a sensible and
justified response to increased reports of police violence.'
Yet before the South Carolina Legislature sent the bill to Governor
Haley, it added a blanket exemption for body-worn camera videos from
the state's Freedom of Information Act. 4 The amendment plainly reads:
"Data recorded by a body-worn camera is not a public record subject to

t B.A. 2012, American University; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School. My thanks and gratitude go to Professor Lior Strahilevitz for his insightful comments
and guidance; Tori Grant for her excellent analysis of what was a nebulous topic proposal; and my
fianc6e Shelby Krick for her ceaseless support and understanding.

' S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1) (2015); Gov. Haley Signs Body CameraBill, WYFF4 (June
10, 2015, 8:16 PM), http://www.wyff4.com/news/gov-haley-to-sign-body-camera-bill/33500718
[https://perma.ce/2ART-JYTNI.
2 South Carolina's Body Camera Bill Is Now Law, WISTV10 (June 20, 2015, 5:07 PM),
http: //www.wistv.com/story/29289442/south-carolinas-body-camera-bill-is-now-law

[https: lperma.cc/49L2-H9G2].
See, e.g., Harriet Mcleod, South Carolina Legislators Approve Body Cameras for Police,
REUTERS

(May

13,

2015,

4:57

PM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-cameras-

idUSKBNONY2IX20150513 [https://perma.cc/8EDF-BAMW].
4 Paul Bowers, South CarolinaPolice Body Cam Videos to Remain Hidden from Public, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA (June 12, 2015, 5:00 AM ET), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/
6/12/south-carolina-police-body-cam-videos-hidden-from-public.html
[https://perma.cc/WZW5T9MQ].
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disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act."5 Thus, instead of

being subject to a presumption of disclosure like other South Carolina
public records, 6 body-worn camera videos are disclosed at law
enforcement's discretion.7
In order to promote more accountability among law enforcement,
many commentators have portrayed body-worn cameras as a panacea
of transparency. 8 Touting the videos' benefits, federal judges have
mandated their use 9 and the Department of Justice recommends them
as a best practice. 10 The use of body-worn cameras as a tool for
additional accountability, however, must be reassessed if their
availability to the public can be curtailed through blanket exemptions
to Freedom of Information laws."
Body-worn camera videos may be unconditionally exempted from
Freedom of Information law disclosure requirements through either
legislative or judicial means. South Carolina illustrates the legislative
method: providing a specific statutory exemption from the Act's
provisions. The other method is judicial. Under federal Freedom of
Information jurisprudence-and that of many states-courts may deem
certain public records to be categorically or generally exempt. 12 Courts
make such exemptions by determining that the factual circumstances
surrounding a type of record will normally lead it to be covered by an
existing exemption to the Freedom of Information statute. They
therefore exempt all records of that type. 13 For example, in the context

" S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-240(G)(1)

(2015).

6 South Carolina law states that '"Public record' includes all books, papers, maps,
photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, or other documentary materials regardless of physical form
or characteristics prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(c) (2015). Other state and federal definitions are similar.
Bowers, supra note 4.

Brian Pafudi, Chapter Four: ConsideringBody Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1796
(2015); see also Mark Berman, Justice Dept. Will Spend $20 Million on Police Body Cameras
Nationwide, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2015/05/01/justice-dept-to-help-police-agencies-across-the-country-get-body-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/4Y4T-BEFR].
9 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (mandating
the implementation of police-worn body cameras for a one-year period as a remedy for alleged
police abuse).
'0 FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 31-36 (2015)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE].

" Kimberly Kindy & Julie Tate, Police Withhold Videos Despite Vows of Transparency, WASH.
POST (Oct. 8, 2015), http:/www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/10/08/police-withhold-videosdespite-vows-of-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/5452-SWA7] (reporting that fewer than half of
police killings caught on body-worn cameras have been publicly released).
12 HARRY A. HAMMITT ET AL., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS
2010, 228, 233 (25th ed. 2010).
13

Id.
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of law enforcement, federal courts have deemed rap sheets, mug shots,
autopsy photographs, and witness statements to be categorically
exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests. 14
This Comment examines whether police body-worn camera videos
are or should be eligible for a categorical exemption. Unlike South
Carolina, the vast majority of states have not passed specific body-worn
camera exemptions. 15 Additionally, due to the recent implementation of
body-worn cameras, little litigation exists to shed light on when such
videos must be disclosed. 16 Should judicially determined categorical
exemptions be applied to police body-worn camera videos, it would shift
the perspective of many analyses of body-worn camera benefits.1 7
Specifically, examining how existing exemptions apply to body-worn
camera videos can provide insights on their likely effect on police
accountability and transparency.1 8
There are both state and federal Freedom of Information laws.
Although state statutes vary in their details and procedures, most
follow the broad contours of the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 19 Importantly, most state statutes mimic FOIA's presumption
of disclosure for records covered under their respective statutes. 20 This
Comment will use FOIA as an interpretive guide for both future state
and federal litigation. By focusing its analysis on national FOIA cases,
this Comment outlines the legal contours of body-worn camera video
disclosure.

See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989) (rap sheets); World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir.
2012) (mug shots); Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252-53
(10th Cir. 2011) (autopsy photographs); Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504
(11th Cir. 2011) (mug shots); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)
(witness statements).

" See Sarah Breitenbach, States Grapple With Public Disclosure of Police Body-Camera
Footage (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/
09/22/states-grapple-with-public-disclosure-of-police-body-camera-footage
[https://perma.cefZW36R55W] (noting that as of Fall 2015, ten states has passed open records amendments addressing
body-worn camera videos).
16 See Pafudi, supra note 8, at 1807.
17

See, e.g., JAY STANLEY, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES
IN PLACE,

A WIN FOR ALL, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 2015).
' 5 U.S.C. § 552. See generally JOSH DIVINE ET AL., POLICE BODY CAM FOOTAGE: JUST
ANOTHER PUBLIC RECORD, ABRAMS INSTITUTE (Dec. 2015).
'9 Justin Cox, Maximizing Information's Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 387, 414 (2010).
20
See, e.g., Stearn v. Wheaton-Warrenville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 200, 910 N.E.2d 85, 94
(Ill. 2009) ("Public records are presumed to be open and accessible."); Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393
N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he public is vested with an inherent right to know and ... official
secrecy is anathematic to our form of government.").
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The Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a statutory
overview of FOIA. After the history and broad themes of the statute are
clear, Part II examines FOIA's Exemption 7-the Law Enforcement
Exemption. Specifically, this Comment outlines the two subsections of
Exemption 7 likely to apply to body-worn camera videos: 7(A) covering
records that are likely to interfere with law enforcement investigations;
and 7(C) covering records that could reasonably lead to an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. Part III analyzes the case law on both 7(A)
and 7(C) that has crafted categorical exemptions that shield certain
types of records. Once the analysis establishes the outlines and
principles justifying these categorical exemptions, Part IV forms an
argument in two parts. First, it posits that state courts likely will not
make police body-worn cameras categorically exempt according to FOIA
precedent. Next, the Comment concludes that examining the
applicability of exemptions to body-worn camera videos on a case-bycase basis strengthens their transparency benefits without unduly
eroding personal privacy or the integrity of ongoing investigations.
II. FOIA AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION
Statutory and case law provide the American public with a right to
access the records of government agencies. 21 In the federal system,
FOIA is the governing statute. 22 Though it establishes a presumption of
disclosure for public records, FOIA recognizes that countervailing
interests in specific contexts-including law enforcement-may weigh
against the interests of disclosure. 23 Before addressing categorical
exemptions under FOIA, this section explores the foundation of how
FOIA and the courts applying it examine relevant interests. Part II.A
traces the history of FOIA and its basic framework. Part II.B then
explains how federal FOIA precedent can influence state courts
interpreting their own public records laws. Finally, Part II.C examines
FOIA's Law Enforcement Exemption. It focuses on the contours of two
specific subcomponents: 7(A) covering records reasonably likely to
interfere with law enforcement investigations; and 7(C) covering
records that could reasonably lead to an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.

21 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
22
5 U.S.C. § 552.
23
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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The Freedom of Information Act

When enacted in 1966, FOIA established the statutory right of the
public to obtain information from federal government agencies.2 4
Previous disclosure requirements under the Administrative Procedures
Act were "full of loopholes which allow[ed] agencies to deny legitimate
information to the public" and "cover up embarrassing mistakes or
irregularities[.]" 2 5 Fearful of an unaccountable and unelected
bureaucratic malaise, Congress framed transparency as a key
component of democracy. 26 President Johnson echoed this justification
when signing FOIA into law, declaring that "[a] democracy works best
when the people have all the information that the security of the
Nation permits." 27
The statute intends to "implement a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure." 28 Accordingly, § 552(a)(3) "requires every agency
upon any request for records which . ..

reasonably describe

such

records to make such records promptly available to any person." 29
Historically, FOIA was constructed with paper records in mind. 30 Both
statutory amendments and case law have since clarified that electronic
audio and visual files also qualify as government records.3 1 In pursuit
of disclosure, FOIA also flips the typical burdens of administrative law.

24

id.

25

S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).

"

See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A.

Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the

Government's Up To, 11 COMM'N L. & POL'Y 511, 517-25 (2006) (examining the historical
background leading to FOIA's enactment); see also Jodi L. Short, The ParanoidStyle in Regulatory
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2012) (chronicling the fear of undemocratic bureaucracies
throughout American history).
27 H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996) (quoting Statement by the President Upon Signing
the

"Freedom of Information Act", 2 Pub. Papers 699 (July 4, 1966)).
28 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Id. at 755 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 4 (1965).
2
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) amendments were made law in 1996.
See Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis,

The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court

Treatment of the Reporters Committee "CentralPurpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983,
1013-14 (2002) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 11-12 (1996)) ("The main reason why Congress
drafted the amendments was because legislators wanted to add certain electronic provisions to the

FOIA to make clear that the statue [sic] applied to electronically recorded and stored
information.") [hereinafter Halstuk & Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned]; see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that an audiotape of Space Shuttle
Challenger astronauts is a "record" and noting that "FOIA makes no distinction between
information in lexical and . . . non-lexical form[.]"); Save the Dolphins v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
404 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding that a movie is a "record" for purposes of
FOIA).
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While an agency decision usually must be upheld unless a plaintiff
demonstrates the decision was arbitrary and capricious, 32 FOIA
specifically shifts the burden to the withholding agency "to sustain its
action" of nondisclosure. 33 The statute also empowers the district court
to review the matter de novo. 3 4
FOIA's Interaction with State Law

B.

Though state Freedom of Information laws are jurisdictionally
separate, state courts often interpret state statutes based on federal
precedent. New York's public disclosure law, the Freedom of
Information Law (FOIL), is a helpful illustration of how influential
FOIA can be on state law. The Court of Appeals of New York has noted
that FOIL's "legislative history . . . indicates that many of its
provisions . . . were patterned after the Federal analogue." 35 Even New
York's "law enforcement exemption is modeled on 5 USC § 552 (b)(7)." 36
As a result, New York courts find that "[f]ederal case law and
legislative history are instructive when interpreting such provisions." 37
Numerous other state courts use federal precedent as persuasive
authority due to the similar parallels between their state's public
record laws and FOIA. 38 Of course, these similarities are not universal
across all state public record laws. 39 Therefore, state courts looking to
use federal FOIA as persuasive authority typically specify statutory
parallels first before analyzing any federal court's reasoning. 40 The
32

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).
Id. at 141.
35 Lesher v. Hynes, 968 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 2012).
3 Id.
33

'

1 Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 992 N.Y.S.2d 870, 891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Hynes, N.E.2d at 455).
3
See, e.g., Montenegro v. City of Dover, 34 A.3d 717 (N.H. 2011) (noting that the court
"look[s] to the decisions of other jurisdictions, since other similar acts, because they are in pari
materia, are interpretively helpful, especially in understanding the necessary accommodation of
the competing interests involved"); Evening News Ass'n v. City of Troy, 339 N.W.2d 421, 428
(Mich. 1983) (finding "[t]he similarity between the [state] FOIA and the federal act invites analogy
when deciphering the various sections and attendant judicial interpretations"); Jenson v.
Schiffman, 544 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (determining "the current version of 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7) constitutes a persuasive catalog of the principle purposes to be served by our

comparable statute").
39

See Mercer v. South Dakota Attorney Gen. Office, 864 N.W.2d 299, 304 (S.D. 2015) ("Here,

we have no similar statutory language related to an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"')

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
40
See, e.g., Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol, 233 Cal. App. 4th 353, 366 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
(observing that "the [Public Records Act] is modeled on the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552), so the judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve
to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart") (internal citation and quotation
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closer the parallels, the more persuasive state courts find federal

FOIA.4 1
C.

The Law Enforcement Exemption

While FOIA's broad provisions favor the disclosure of information
to the public, its mandate is not absolute.4 2 Section 552(b) lists nine
exemptions from FOIA's disclosure requirements.4 3 Courts have held
that these exemptions are discretionary, still allowing an agency to
disclose potentially exempt information if that agency concludes that
there would be no resulting harm from public disclosure.44 When a
requested document contains only some information that falls within
an exemption, any "reasonably segregable portion" of the document
should be released to the requester once the exempted information is
redacted.4 5 In keeping with this tradition of full disclosure, the
exemptions themselves are also construed narrowly. 6 Moreover, only
the government can raise these interests in the context of FOIA
litigation.4 7
One of FOIA's exemptions is the Law Enforcement Exemption,
numerically and interchangeably referenced as Exemption 7.48
Congress's preeminent concern in enacting Exemption 7 was the fear
marks omitted).
41
See Cox, supra note 19, at 413.
42
See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) ("Congress sought 'to
reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and the need of the Government

to keep information in confidence[.]"') (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 6 (1966)).
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
4
45

4

See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9).
See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that courts have

"repeatedly stated that these exemptions from disclosure must be construed narrowly, in such a
way as to provide maximum access").

4

See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979) (holding that "FOIA is purely a

disclosure statute and affords . . . no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure").

48

5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7).

The Exemption covers "records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records

or information: A. could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; B.
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, C. could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; D. could reasonably be

expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local or foreign agency
or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in
the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of
a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; E. would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law; or F. could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety
of any individual."
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that disclosure requirements would "harm [the] Government's case in
court" by allowing litigants premature access to key investigatory
documents. 49 These concerns have since expanded to protect six specific
interests as enumerated by the statute.50 A 1974 amendment further
clarified legislative intent by replacing investigatory "files" with
"records."5 1 In making "records" the operative word, Congress
elucidated that the Exemption did not endlessly protect material
simply because it was in an investigatory file. 52 This focused the
inquiry on the nature of the requested document itself.53 The 1986

FOIA amendments, however, deleted the word "investigatory" and
added the words "or information" so that Exemption 7 protections are
potentially available to all "records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes." 54

As written, the relevant portion of the statute sets forth a two-step
framework. In order to qualify for any of the Exemption 7 subsections,
the government must first demonstrate that the requested material
constitutes "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes."5 5 The D.C. Circuit has set the majority test for this threshold
inquiry: a criminal law enforcement agency must demonstrate that (1)
the investigatory activities giving rise to the requested documents were
related to the enforcement of federal laws; and (2) the nexus between
the investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties is
based on a "colorable claim" of rationality. 56 Other circuits have
adopted similar deferential "rational nexus" standards.5 7
49 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978) (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at
9 (1965)).
0 120 CONG. REC. 17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart) [hereinafter "Statement of
Sen. Hart"], reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 333 (1975).
51

*

SOURCE BOOK:

Id. at 91.

Id. at 332.
53Id. at 331.

' See Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 3207 (1986); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(noting that 1986 FOIA amendments broadened threshold for Exemption 7).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
5 Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Keys v. Dep't of Justice, 830
F.2d 337, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("An objective finding of such a nexus is refutable only by
persuasive evidence that in fact another, non-qualifying reason prompted the investigation.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5 See Davin v. Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1045 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he simple recitation of
statutes, orders and public laws is an insufficient showing of a rational nexus to a legitimate law
enforcement concern."); Church of Scientology v. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979)
("An agency which has a clear law enforcement mandate ... need only establish a 'rational nexus'
between enforcement of federal law and the document for which an exemption is claimed."); see
also Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court should not
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After the agency has met this threshold inquiry, the government
proceeds to the second part of the test: demonstrating that disclosure
would result in one of the six harms covered by Exemption 7's
subcomponents.6 8 Of these exemptions, two in particular pose
significant questions for body-worn cameras and categorical
exemptions. Exemption 7(A) protects records that could reasonably be
expected to "interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5 9 Exemption 7(C)
protects records that could "reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 60 The following sections
analyze the case law establishing the general contours of Exemptions
7(A) and 7(C) in order to contextualize Part III's analysis of the
emergence and application of categorical exemptions.
1. Exemption 7(A): interference with law enforcement proceedings.
When seeking nondisclosure under subsection (A) of Exemption 7,
agencies must demonstrate that the release of the requested records
"could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings."6 1 As with the larger Law Enforcement Exemption, 7(A) is
primarily concerned with opportunistic uses of FOIA by targets of
investigations. 62
A record must meet two requirements to avoid disclosure under
Exemption 7(A). First, the government must show that the record
relates to an active or pending enforcement proceeding. 63 Lifting a
phrase directly from the Congressional Record of the 1974 FOIA
amendments, courts have upheld the exemption when there is a
''concrete prospect" that an investigation will lead to a law enforcement
proceeding. 64 Courts interpret the "prospect" through the general
nature of the possible proceeding, not the specific circumstances of the
case.6 5 This still requires agencies to specify the nature of pending
proceedings. 66 "Concrete prospects," however, appear to provide few
engage in a factual inquiry as to the legitimacy of the FBI's asserted law enforcement purpose).

"
5
0
61
6

63

John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 156 (1989); see also supra note 48.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).
Statement of Sen. Hart, supra note 50.
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1978).

* Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Carson v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Statement of Sen. Hart, supra note 50.
Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the court did
not need to determine that a particular individual-in this case a former Austrian presidentwould likely initiate proceedings to deem such proceedings "reasonably anticipated").
" See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 658 F.Supp.2d
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temporal limitations. The D.C. Circuit took an expansive view in
Juarez v. United States Department of Justice,67 finding that the
government meets the first prong "so long as the investigation
continues to gather evidence for a possible criminal case[.]"6 8 A possible
implication of this interpretation is that the government may bar
disclosure by holding an impending investigation open indefinitely. 69
The limits of Juarez, however, have not been fully tested by lower
courts.
Under the second prong of 7(A), the government must also
demonstrate how disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere
with the specified law enforcement proceeding. Reasonable likelihood of
interference is adequate; the government "need not establish that
release of a particular document would actually interfere with an
enforcement proceeding."70 Courts have recognized two particular
harms: where disclosure would reveal "the size, scope and direction of
[the] investigation" or "allow for the destruction or alteration of
relevant evidence, and the fabrication of fraudulent alibis."7 1 The
agency still must explain this harm to the court and make this
demonstration "by more than [a] conclusory statement." 72
2. Exemption 7(C): unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Assuming that the contested record was "compiled for law
enforcement purposes," 73 Exemption 7(C) erects two additional textual
requirements. First, the records must "reasonably be expected" to
interfere with privacy. Second, this privacy interference must be
"unwarranted." 74 Courts have interpreted this to mean that the costs of
the invasion must outweigh the benefits of disclosure.7 5 Thus, federal
courts engage in a balancing test before applying the exemption,
217, 229 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that Mapotherrequired that "proceedings must be more narrowly
defined than" unspecified and ambiguous future proceedings).
67 518 F.3d 54 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
'

Id. at 59.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 992 F.2d 1426 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
FBI investigation into the disappearance of Jimmy Hoffa was still open and there was a
reasonable prospect of proceedings even though disputed documents had been collected fifteen
years earlier).
70 Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in
original).
7' Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep't of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
71 Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 682 F.2d 256, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
7
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
7 Id.
7
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 777
(1989).
69

873]

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN'S TAPE?

883

weighing the public interest in disclosure against the privacy rights of
the affected individual. 76As the analysis below demonstrates, courts
perform this balancing test under a "presumption of legitimacy" for
government conduct.
Textual comparisons of these components with other sections of
FOIA demonstrate that Congress intended Exemption 7(C) to be
relatively broad.77 Exemption 6 also protects privacy, covering
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."78
Courts have found that two textual differences make the language of
Exemption 7(C) broader than the language in Exemption 6, one
difference for each textual component. First, while Exemption 6
specifies disclosures that "would constitute" an invasion of privacy,
Exemption 7(C) refers to any disclosure that "could reasonably be
expected to constitute" such an invasion. 79 Second, while Exemption 6
requires that the invasion of privacy be "clearly unwarranted," the
adverb "clearly" is omitted from Exemption 7(C).8 0 These changes
suggest that Congress wanted to ensure that agencies would face a
lower burden in justifying nondisclosure under Exemption 7(C) than
under Exemption 6.81
Two Supreme Court cases deal extensively with Exemption 7(C). 82
Because they offer key insights into categorical exemptions, they will be
discussed at length in Part III. Here, however, it is important to
identify several principles that apply to all litigation under this
exemption. First, United States Department of Justice v. Reporters'
Committee For Freedom of Press83 establishes that citizens' right to
know "what their government is up to" is the only cognizable public
interest under FOIA. 84 Thus, courts will only recognize a public interest
if disclosure furthers the "central purpose" of FOIA by "shed[ding] light
on an agency's performance of its statutory duties[.]" 85 Any other
interest is outside FOIA's scope. 86

id.
n7 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), with § 552(b)(6).
78 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis
added).
7

'

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756.

so

Id.

81

HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 12, at 228.

See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749; Nat'1 Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.
157 (2004).
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
"
Id. at 773.
* Id.
86 Id.
82
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When balancing the public and privacy interests, the Supreme
Court established the governing two-prong test of Exemption 7(C) in
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish.87 Under the
first "sufficient reason" prong, the requester must identify a
"significant" public interest beyond just disclosure for its own sake if
disclosure implicates a privacy interest.8 8 Next, the requester is
required to demonstrate that the information is "likely to advance" the
identified public interest. 9 If this interest is related to a claim that
government officials acted improperly in performing their duties, the
requester must produce "clear evidence" that would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the alleged government malfeasance might have
occurred.9 0 The court created a "presumption of legitimacy" for the
government's official conduct, explaining that allegations of
government misconduct are "easy to allege and hard to disprove."9 1
Although FOIA requesters generally do not need to state the reasons
they want certain information, Favish eliminates this presumption
once the agency cites Exemption 7(C). 92
III. CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION PRINCIPLES
When interests implicated by exemptions are frequently present,
entire classes of records can be categorically exempted from FOIA
requests. The use of categorical exemptions allows courts to eschew the
in camera and document-by-document review that typifies most FOIA
proceedings. 93 Typically, courts make such exemptions by determining
that the qualities of a type of record will normally lead it to be covered
by an existing exemption to the Freedom of Information statute. 94 This
section examines how courts have determined whether a particular
document type may be categorically exempt under Exemption 7(A) or
7(C). Part IV then applies these principles to body-worn cameras.

541 U.S. 157 (2004).
Id. at 172 (The Court declined to "attempt to define the reasons that will suffice" as a
significant public interest.).
8 Id.
' Id. at 173.
8
8

91

Id.

92

93

Id.
HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 12, at 9.

9

Id.
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Exemption 7(A): Interference with Law Enforcement Proceedings

The Supreme Court first allowed agencies to categorically exempt
records from FOIA's disclosure requirements in NLRB v. Robbins Tire
and Rubber Co. 95 There, a company charged with an unfair labor
practice sought disclosure of the statements of witnesses the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) intended to call at a hearing. 96 The
Court found that the exemption allowed the NLRB to withhold
disclosure of all of the statements.97 In doing so, the Court refused to
restrict agency determinations of "interference" to only case-by-case
bases; instead, it found that Exemption 7(A) allowed agencies to make
categorical distinctions across certain types of evidence that apply
beyond the immediate case in which that distinction was made. 98 In its
analysis, the Court considered the text of the statute as well as specific
facts in the case that rendered applying a categorical exemption
appropriate.
First, the Court noted that the text of the law appears to allow
agencies to make such generic determinations. Interestingly, its textual
analysis attempts to distinguish 7(A)'s language from that of the other
"subdivisions":
There is a readily apparent difference between subdivision (A)
and subdivisions (B), (C), and (D). The latter subdivisions refer
to particular cases - "a person," "an unwarranted invasion," "a
confidential source" - and thus seem to require a showing that
the factors made relevant by the statute are present in each
distinct situation. By contrast, since subdivision (A) speaks in
the plural voice about "enforcement proceedings," it appears to
contemplate that certain generic determinations might be
made. 99

The Court did not believe legislative history precluded categorical
exemptions either. Referencing again back to the 1974 amendments,
the Court noted that Congress wanted to clarify that "material cannot
be and ought not be exempt merely because it can be categorized as an
investigatory file compiled for law enforcement
purposes."10 0

96

*
9

"

437 U.S. 214 (1978).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 227 (quoting FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS SOURCE BOOK:

0
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 333 (1975)

(internal quotation marks
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Eliminating "blanket exemptions" for investigatory files however, did
not mean that generic determinations of likely interference for types of
documents were also eliminated. 101 The Court saw the two
determinations as distinguishable, and that Congress had only barred
the former. 102
Analyzing the facts, the Court identified a unique potential for
witness intimidation in the context of NLRB unfair labor practice
proceedings. 103 Typically, witness statements would not be available
until a witness actually testified. 10 4 Thus, the Court determined that
"prehearing disclosure of witnesses' statements would involve the kind
of harm that Congress believed would constitute an 'interference' with
NLRB enforcement proceedings: that of giving a party litigant earlier
and greater access to the Board's case than he otherwise would
have."1 05
Robbins Tire has since been applied to other law enforcement
proceedings where courts have determined that disclosure of a
functional category of documents would equate to giving litigants
premature access to the government's evidence and strategy. 106 The
D.C. Circuit requires functionally-defined categories so that courts may
assess how release of the documents would result in interference.1 0 7 For
example, the court found that documents "identified only as teletypes,
or airtels, or letters . . . provide no basis for a judicial assessment[.]"10 8
B.

Exemption 7(C): Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy

In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court expanded its holding
from Robbins Tire to establish the appropriateness of "categorical
balancing" under Exemption 7(C). 109 In this case, the Court found that
the government may categorically deny FOIA requests for rap sheets.1 10
omitted)).
1o1 Id. at 236.
102
Id. (The Court noted that "[a]lthough Congress could easily have required in so many words
that the Government in each case show a particularized risk to its individual 'enforcement
proceedin[g]' it did not do so[.]" (citation omitted).
"0 Id. at 240.
104
Id. at 241.
1o5 Id.
'0
See Bevis v. U.S. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that the
FBI "must define its categories functionally" before a court can determine if a generic
determination is appropriate).
107 Id. at 1390.
1as Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
'0' U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 778-79
(1989).
110 Id. at 780.
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Noting that individual distinctions can be disregarded when the
balance of interests in a particular category characteristically tips in
one direction, the Court explained that:
When the subject of such a rap sheet is a private citizen and
when the information is in the Government's control as a
compilation, rather than as a record of "what the Government is
up to," the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in
fact at its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in
disclosure is at its nadir. Such a disparity on the scales of justice
holds for a class of cases without regard to individual
circumstances; the standard virtues of bright-line rules are thus
present, and the difficulties attendant to ad hoc adjudication
may be avoided."'
As a result, in such categories, "the standard virtues of bright-line
rules are thus present, and the difficulties attendant to ad hoc
adjudication should be avoided." 112 Although it cited Robbins Tire in
support, the Court curiously skimmed over the part of Robbins Tire's
textual analysis that contrasted 7(C)'s singular tense with 7(A)'s plural
tenses, which implied that categorical distinctions were only justified
for 7(A).
1. Privacy interests are high in a law enforcement context.
Reporters Committee illustrates how courts establish privacy
interests for categorical exemptions. Justice Stevens's majority opinion
specified that an individual's privacy interest in restricting the
disclosure of a rap sheet was "in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters." 113 He rejected arguments that this privacy interest was
minimal because the information collected on a rap sheet was publicly
available elsewhere as individual pieces; Justice Stevens reasoned if
the pieces of information "were 'freely available,' there would be no
reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to [them]." 1 14 The opinion
bolstered this conclusion by pointing to congressional, state, and FBI
policies specifically designed to limit disclosure of rap sheets.11 5
.. Id. (internal citation omitted).
112
id.
11.
Id. at 762. The appellate court defined "rap sheets" as "FBI records on individuals whose
fingerprints have been submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests and, in certain instances,
employment, naturalization and military service." Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press v.
Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 732 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
114 Reporters Comm., 489
at 764.
"5 Id. at 764-66; see also Gregory Nathaniel Wolfe, Comment, Smile for the Camera, the
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Following this decision, courts have continually recognized the
'strong [privacy] interest' of individuals, whether they be suspects,
witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated unwarrantedly with
alleged criminal activity."' 1 16 For example, in Fitzgibbon v. CIA,1 17 the
D.C. Circuit affirmed that individuals mentioned in an FBI
investigatory file have a strong privacy interest in preventing
disclosure." The court found that "[i]t is surely beyond dispute that
the mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will
engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing
connotation."1 19 As a result, courts continue to find that for those
involved in law enforcement investigations, "the individual's privacy
interest is quite clear." 120 Accordingly, courts have applied this logic to
find categorical exemptions for autopsy photographs and mug shots. 121
Courts have also found that a privacy interest exists for
government employees being investigated for improper conduct.
Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit has indicated, "[government employees] do
not surrender all rights to personal privacy when they accept a public
appointment." 12 2 Indeed, courts typically find a strong privacy interest
in documents pertaining to law enforcement officials. 123

World Is Going to See That Mug: The Dilemma of Privacy Interests in Mug Shots, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2227, 2235 (2013).
n1 Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737
F.2d 84,
91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that
FBI Special Agents and third-party suspects have "substantial interest[s] in the nondisclosure of
their identities and their connection[s] to particular investigations"); Quifion v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222,
1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that "[p]ersons involved in FBI investigations-even if they are not
the subject of the investigation-have a substantial interest in seeing that their participation
remains secret").
1
911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
us

Id. at 767.

Id. (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
119

120

Id.

World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012) (mug
shots); Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252-53 (10th Cir.
2011) (autopsy photographs). But see Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 93,
97 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that no privacy interests are implicated by the release of mug shots in
cases where the defendant has already appeared in court).
122
Best v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123
See, e.g., Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing strong privacy
interests of suspects and law enforcement officers when requested documents neither confirm nor
refute plaintiff's allegations of government misconduct); Greenberg v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that privacy interests of individuals mentioned in FBI
surveillance tapes and transcripts obtained in arms-for-hostages investigation clearly outweigh
any public interest in disclosure).
121
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The D.C. Circuit in SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC 1 2 4 combined the
reasoning behind the traditional recognition of the strong privacy
interests inherent in law enforcement records with the holding of
Reporters Committee to conclude that the categorical withholding of
information that identifies third parties in law enforcement records will
ordinarily be appropriate under Exemption 7(C). 125 It introduced the
"compelling evidence" test for evaluating the weight of the public
interest in the exceptional case where a categorical exemption
otherwise applied:
[U]nless there is compelling evidence that the agency denying
the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity, and access to ...
enforcement files is necessary in order to confirm or refute that
evidence, there is no reason to believe that the incremental
public interest in such information would ever be significant.126
Since the decision, two other circuits have adopted this compelling
evidence test in approving categorical distinctions. 12 7
2. Limited public interests make overcoming a privacy interest
difficult.
Under Reporters Committee, the public interest recognized under
FOIA is specifically limited to FOIA's "core purpose" of "shed[ding] light
on an agency's performance of its statutory duties[.]" 128 Whether an
invasion of privacy is warranted depends on "the nature of the
requested document and its relationship to the 'basic purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny."' 129 Accordingly, information that does not reveal the
operations and activities of the government does not satisfy the public
interest requirement. 130

12
125
126

926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1206.
Id. at 1205-06.

12 See World Publ'g Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831 n.1 (10th Cir.
2012) (adopting compelling evidence test in context of mug shot disclosure); Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d
461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2000) (adopting compelling evidence as proper interpretation of Reporters
Committee).
128

U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773

(1989).
12

13a

Id. at 772 (citations omitted).
Id. at 773.
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Allegations of government misconduct must be substantiated in
order to establish a sufficient public interest. 131 Unsubstantiated
allegations of official misconduct are insufficient to establish a public
interest in disclosure; Favish made it clear that "bare suspicion" of
misconduct is inadequate and that a requester must produce evidence
that would be credible in the eyes of a reasonable person. 132 Thus when
public official misconduct is the justification for disclosure, the
requester must make a "meaningful evidentiary showing" in order to
prove a sufficient public interest. 133
If a requester does identify a public interest that qualifies for
consideration under Reporters Committee and Favish, the requester
must also demonstrate that the public interest in disclosure is
sufficiently compelling to, on balance, outweigh legitimate privacy
interests. When this burden is met, courts have found that the balance
tilts in favor of disclosure and that release of third-party information is
justified. American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense1 34
provides an example. There, the Second Circuit found that the
production of photographs depicting prisoner abuse by government
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, once the court redacted identifying
features to protect identities of the prisoners depicted, raised only
minimal privacy concerns insufficient to allow the withholding of
photographs under Exemption 7(C). 135
IV. CATEGORICAL EXEMPTIONS AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS

Having established the contours of FOIA, sections 7(A) and 7(C) of
the Law Enforcement Exemption, and the categorical exemption
framework, the remainder of this Comment applies the law to police
body-worn camera videos. As the preceding section demonstrates,
courts make categorical exemptions based on properties that are
inherent in the contested record category-those that do not change
based on the factual circumstances of any particular case. 136
Accordingly, the Comment proceeds in two sections. Part IV.A
demonstrates that state courts following FOIA precedent would be
hesitant to make police body-worn cameras categorically exempt. Next,
Part IV.B concludes that examining the applicability of exemptions to

13

See Nat'1 Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).

132

id.

13

Id. at 175.

131

Id. at 86-87.

11

See supra Part I.

543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds 558 U.S. 1042 (2009).
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body-worn camera videos on a case-by-case basis strengthens their
transparency benefits without unduly eroding personal privacy or the
integrity of ongoing investigations.
The analysis below contains two assumptions. First, it assumes
that body-worn camera videos qualify as public records. Second, it
assumes that these videos satisfy the threshold requirement of
Exemption 7: that the records are compiled for law enforcement
purposes. 137 There may be colorable arguments against this assumption
if state laws have a more finely wrought framework for this
requirement.13 8 A more in depth comparison, however, is outside the
scope of this Comment's focus on categorical exemptions.
A.

State Courts that Follow FOIA Precedent Will Be Unlikely to
Carve Out Categorical Exemptions for Police Body-worn Camera
Videos

A court considering categorically exempting body-worn camera
videos under federal FOIA precedent would have two prominent
options under the Law Enforcement Exemption. To apply 7(A), the
court must conclude that disclosing videos would reasonably interfere
with ongoing investigations. To apply 7(C), the court must find that
releasing body-worn camera videos categorically results in an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Examining the use and
nature of body-worn cameras, however, indicates that neither of these
requirements can be categorically satisfied.
1. A video's potential to interfere with an ongoing investigation
under 7(A) varies with the factual circumstances of a
particular case.
Unlike their treatment of 7(C), case law and Congress have
provided relatively consistent justifications for the use of 7(A). The
exemption is consistently applied to prevent litigants from gaining
premature access to records that would expose and undermine the
extent of the government's investigation. 1 39 This creates the two-prong
test: (1) identifying an ongoing investigation and (2) establishing a
reasonable likelihood of interference with that proceeding.140

"

Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., N. J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 116 A.3d 570, 591-92 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2015) (finding that dashboard camera recordings were "not required by law to be made"
and were therefore not considered to be made for law enforcement purposes under state law).
'" See supra Part II.C.
14o
Id.
138
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The majority of commentators envision the use of body-worn
camera videos in the context of individual police encounters (as opposed
to investigations of systematic police misconduct). 1 4 1 One can imagine
the scene: An officer or a group of officers attempts to make an arrest.
In the process of making the arrest, the arrestee is injured or killed.
The family members allege police brutality, while the officers claim
their actions are justified. 142 In this context, the first prong of the 7(A)
test is likely to be satisfied. Police departments will begin an official
investigation, either into the conduct of the officer or the arrestee.
Either creates an ongoing investigation with a "concrete prospect" of a
law enforcement proceeding. 143 The key question, therefore, is whether
the public release of the officer's body-worn camera video, if part of a
functional category, is reasonably likely to interfere with these
proceedings.
a. "Body-worn camera videos" is not a functional category
As explained in Part III, the First, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits
require that agencies seeking to exempt a category of investigatory
material must functionally define their categories. 144 A functional
definition allows the court to analyze whether the alleged harm of
disclosure is reasonably likely to occur. 145 Bevis demonstrates the
distinction. 146 In this case, the FBI described some files as "the
identities of possible witnesses and informants," and "reports on the
location and viability of potential evidence." 14 7 The D.C. Circuit
accepted these descriptions as functional. In rejecting other
descriptions such as "letters," the court stated that such nominal
descriptions "provide no basis for a judicial assessment of the FBI's
assertions" of interference. 1 4 8
141
See, e.g., Fanny Coudert et al., Body-Worn Camerasfor Police Accountability: Opportunities
and Risks, 31 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 749, 750-54 (2015); Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and
Cameras: Officer Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM.
JUST. 549, 550 (2015).
142
See, e.g., Al Baker et. al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner's Death, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2015), http: //www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokeholdstaten-island.html?_- r=0 [https://perma.cefI8FB-4E2Y] ("Officer Pantaleo testified to trying a
takedown move during the arrest and said he began holding Mr. Garner's neck out of fear that
they would both crash through a glass storefront.").
See Carson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir.1980); see also Statement
14
of Sen. Hart, supra note 50.
'4
See supra Part IV.A.2.
14' Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
146
Id.
147
148

Id. at 1390.
Id.
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A police department faces the same critique in attempting to
categorically shield "body-worn camera videos" from disclosure. Such a
description does not indicate what is depicted on the video. It does not
allow the court to determine how the videos may reasonably interfere
with the ongoing investigation. 14 9 Without a more functional
explanation of the context of the video, the court's analysis is nearly
impossible to undertake.1 5 0
While not all courts have explicitly adopted this functionality
requirement, it carries significant weight. First, appellate courts give
the D.C. Circuit's FOIA jurisprudence is particular weight, in part due
to its near-monopoly over administrative law cases. 15 1 Second, the
requirement has never been explicitly rejected. Therefore, any court
following FOIA precedent is likely to follow this functional category
requirement.
b. The subject of an individual investigation will likely be.
aware of the information and evidence contained in the video
Upon analyzing FOIA precedent, a police department will provide
a functional description in their attempt to block the disclosure of bodyworn camera videos. A possible description would be "All Police BodyWorn Camera Videos of Officer A's Encounter with John Doe on
1/1/2016."
With this description, proponents of categorical disclosure will
attempt to analogize between the likely dynamic of body-worn camera.
litigation under Exemption 7(A) and that of other requests that courts
have deemed to reasonably interfere with law enforcement proceedings.
Simple comparisons between the witness statements in Robbins Tire
and potential videos reveal several similarities. Both represent key
evidence in relevant proceedings. Both will likely play significant roles
in the defense and prosecution's cases.
However, a key difference is that subjects of investigations would
likely already be aware of the videos' contents. The witness interviews
in NLRB investigations always have the same potential for interference
with law enforcement. 152 There, defendants did not know the identities
of witnesses, nor did they know the content of their statements. 153 This

149
1

In re Dep't of Justice, 999 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1993).
I0
id.

' Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributionsof the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law,
90 GEO. L.J. 779, 779-80 (2002) (equating the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court in the realm of
administrative law).
15

NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).

153

Id.
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information would only be disclosed at the relevant NLRB hearing.1 54
In contrast, the body-worn camera video captures an event of which
both parties would be aware, since they are the very subjects of the
video. Perspectives of the content's implications may differ, and the
specifics of a party's narrative may depend on the clarity of the video's
depiction.15 5 But this is not equivalent to the wholesale discovery of
opposing witnesses that would have occurred in Robbins Tire.
Moreover, both parties would also likely know the video itself exists, as
police departments typically publicize their use of body-worn
cameras.156

When both parties are aware of the existence and content of
requested documents, the likelihood of interference understandably
decreases. The court in Campbell v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services1 5 7 recognized this. In directing the district court to
"conduct a more particularized and focused review" of documents the
government attempted to be categorically exempted under section 7(A),
the court noted that the potential investigatory target already had
access to the requested information. 15 8 Under similar reasoning, the
court in Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Department of
Energy 59 rejected a government claim that regional energy review
opinions were exempted under 7(A). 160 Because such reviews were
already shared with the investigatory targets over the course of routine
regulation, it was "unlikely they would contain anything which is not
already known[.]" 16 1 As a result, the prospect of interference was
equally unlikely. 162 Each of these courts cited the 1974 amendments
when they rejected categorical exemptions, noting that Congress

154

Id.

"' See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (holding that a dashboard camera video
depicting a police car tapping the rear bumper of a fleeing suspect's car and the resulting crash did
not provide sufficient support to the plaintiff's § 1983 to survive a summary judgment dismissal,
reversing a lower court).
156 See, e.g., Kevin Rector, Baltimore Officers on Body Camera Pilot: 'When Can We Get These
Back?', BALT. SUN (Dec. 21, 2015, 8:28 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.cominews/maryland/crime/
blog/bs-md-ci-body-camera-update-2015 122 1-story.html [https://perma.cc/EG9D-M8EV] (reporting
that Baltimore Police Officers were making a public effort to expand the availability of body
cameras).
167 682 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
118 Id. at 265.
159
617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
1

Id. at 870.

151

Id.
Id.
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crafted the language to prevent premature discovery by targets of
criminal cases. 163
There may be select cases where a party is unaware of its presence
on a body-worn camera video. In such circumstances, courts should be
justifiably concerned with interference in the investigation. However,
this is not likely to be the norm. There will undoubtedly be cases where
both the police officer and the arrestee are aware of the videotape and
its content, lowering FOIA's value as a preemptive discovery tool.
Therefore, when applied to body-worn cameras, this precedent similarly
tips the balance away from invoking the categorical exemption under
7(A).
c. The police department would likely still be able to "shape and
control" immediate and future investigations
Proponents of categorical exemptions may seek to expand the scope
of harms relevant under 7(A) beyond that of the record's corresponding
investigation. They may try to argue the record's release will interfere
with other or future investigations. In doing so, they would cite cases
like J.P Stevens & Co. v. Perry.164 There, the Fourth Circuit found that
the diminished ability to "shape and control investigations" along with
a greater difficulty to perform "future investigations" were cognizable
harms.16 5 Even assuming that these "future investigations" were
concrete enough to satisfy 7(A)'s first requirement, however, police
departments would still need to establish that body-worn camera
videos would interfere with these investigations on a categorical basis.
Those who seek to limit access to body-worn camera videos
routinely contend that the increased publicity associated with
disclosure of a controversial police interaction would create a ripple
effect of interference across future investigations.1 66 However, courts
have viewed unspecified or general claims of harm resulting from
increased publicity skeptically, suggesting that they are outside the
scope of 7(A)'s cognizable harms. Goldschmidt v. United States
Department of Agriculture167 is instructive. There, the court
emphasized that the scope of 7(A)'s harm is explicitly limited to the
163
16
1'

See id.; Campbell, 682 F.2d at 261-62.
710 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 143.

' See Richard W. Van Houten, Jr., Fort Worth Police Officers' Association President,
Testimony at The President's Taskforce of 21st Century Policing (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.cops.
usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/submissions/VanHoutenRichardTestimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7ATHADB].
167 557 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C.
1983).
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168
prospective interference with the law enforcement proceedings.
"Congress never intended 7(A) to be so broad as to prohibit disclosure
where, as here, publicity surrounding an establishment's violations
'interferes' with enforcement by embarrassing" parties involved with
the investigation. 16 9 Otherwise, the exemption would be too broad; "it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which publicity surrounding an
investigation might not have some detrimental effect on the target's
behavior or attitude." 170
At select times, increased publicity could lead to interference with
the investigation to which the record pertains-exposing a long-term
covert investigation is one example. But this would properly be
assessed through an ad hoc review in select circumstances. A court
would be unlikely to find that the release of any body-worn camera
video would result in interference. Therefore, a categorical exemption is
inappropriate.

2. Despite strong privacy interests asserted in body-worn camera
videos, public interests can still meet 7(C)'s strict
requirements.
A court seeking to apply Exemption 7(C) follows the tripartite
framework established by Reporters Committee and Favish: (1) identify
the nature and extent of the privacy rights affected by disclosure, (2)
identify the nature and extent of the public interests in disclosure, and
(3) weigh the competing interests against each other to determine if
disclosure would cause an "unwarranted" invasion of privacy. 171 Even
with the standards that limit relevant public interests and the broad
applicability of 7(C), requests for body-worn camera videos should be
able to avoid being categorically exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
a. Privacy interests
Courts are likely to identify strong privacy interests in body-worn
camera videos. Two different groups will likely have such interests: the
police and those interacting with the police. Additional parties
inadvertently captured on these videos can likely be redacted to protect
their privacy. 172

16

Id. at 276.
Id. at 277-78.

Id. at 278.
171 See supra Part III.B.2.
172
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on
other grounds 558 U.S. 1042 (2009) (finding that redacted photographs raised only minimal
170
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Courts typically find strong privacy interests for all parties
involved in a criminal investigation. The core of Reporters Comm.'s
privacy analysis concluded that individuals have an "interest in
avoiding
disclosure
of personal
matters[.]"17 3
Logically then,
"individuals have a strong interest in not being associated
unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity." 1 7 4 Courts recognize that
such allegations carry with them the threat of harassment and
personal embarrassment. 175 This explains the strong privacy interests
in rap sheets, mug shots, and autopsy photographs. 176 Indeed, each of
these examples offers strong parallels to videos produced by policeworn body cameras. First, body-worn cameras have captured
individuals in highly contentious and controversial actions with
police.1 77 Private individuals face public scrutiny after any interaction
with the police.178 Second, for the police officers themselves, allegations
of misconduct will likely bring equal-if not more-public scrutiny. 1 7 9
One could attempt to distinguish body-worn cameras from these
other records because there is no direct indication of an individual's
name in a video. For example, the rap sheets in Reporters Comm. and
the mug shots in Karantsalis each came with the individual's name
appended to the document in question.18 0 One could argue that without
the name as identifying information, the individuals on the video could
not be "associated" with alleged criminal activity. But this difference is
superficial and temporary at best. Most videos are part of a larger story
privacy concerns); see also Mike Carter, YouTube Channel Showcases Seattle Police Videos,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spd-to-launchyoutube-channel-to-showcase-police-videos/ [https://perma.cc/HS66-MRZN] (reporting that the
Seattle Police Department is developing source code to automatically redact body-worn camera
video footage).
1'
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
174
Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
175
See, e.g., Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765-67 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Abramson v. FBI, 566 F.
Supp. 1371, 1375 (D.D.C. 1983) (public disclosure of the fact that an individual was investigated
by the FBI brings with it the threat of personal embarrassment).
176
See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780 (rap sheets); World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012) (mug shots); Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S.
Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2011) (autopsy photographs); Karantsalis v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (mug shots).
7
Divine et al., supra note 18, at 7.
1
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 507, 535-36 (2001) (noting the "the indignity of being publicly singled out as a criminal
suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by uniformed, armed police officers").
1
Id.; see also Martin Kaste, As More Police Wear Cameras, Policy Questions Arise,
NPR (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/07/142016109/smile-youre-on-cop-camera [https://
perma.cc/3L6T-SGXP].
' See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
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that has already captured the public's attention when released.1 8 1
Therefore, the public would likely know who was depicted in the video,
just as in Favish when requesters knew the identity of the victim in the
crime scene photographs. 182 Moreover, even if the public did not already
know the identities of the recorded parties, this would not be the case
for long. For example, communities of Internet users have successfully
identified subjects of videos via crowdsourcing. 183 The spread of facial
recognition technology also reduces any hope for maintaining
anonymity.1 8 4
Still, it is not clear which way this cuts. One could argue that if the
identity of the officer, or the arrestee, is already known to the public as
a result of other authorized disclosure methods, it decreases any
privacy interest associated with the release of the video.1 85 But this
underestimates the very nature of body-worn cameras. Part of the
reason they are so widely supported is that they are a particularly vivid
record. 186 They offer a raw depiction of any police interaction. More
than merely a name on a page, the video captures the act itself. Courts
have recognized that an audio recording is more invasive to privacy
interests than the transcript of the same conversation.1 87 It is not
difficult to extend this logic to body-worn camera videos, even when the

181

See Kindy, supra note 11.

Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, How Internet Sleuths on Facebook and Reddit Solved the 20-yearold Mystery of a Missing Teenager, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-intersect/wp/2015/12/10/how-internet-sleuths-on-facebook-and-reddit-solved-the-20-yearold-mystery-of-a-missing-teenager [https://perma.cc/9KU2-CXV3] (highlighting how a community
of Facebook and Reddit users identified a deceased car accident victim using only a facial
reconstruction photograph). But see Traci G. Lee, The Real Story of Sunil Tripathi, the Boston
Bomber Who Wasn't, NBC NEWS (June 22, 2015, 9:05 AM), http://www.nbcnews.cominews/asianamerica/wrongly-accused-boston-bombing-sunil-tripathys-story-now-being-told-n373141
[https://perma.cc/46JX-XX6J] (reporting that Reddit users mistakenly identified college student
Sunil Tripathi, who later committed suicide, as the suspected Boston Marathon Bomber).
See Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing's New Visibility and the Role of
18
"SmartphoneJournalism"as a Form of Freedom-PreservingReciprocal Surveillance, 2014 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 59, 90 ("[T]he increasing effectiveness of facial recognition software ... means
that simply recording an image of a person [on a police body-worn camera] can lead to further
identification.").
18
See Schmerler v. FBI, 696 F. Supp. 717, 725 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that the names of FBI
agents involved in a murder investigation could not be withheld when their involvement had been
fully revealed by authorized disclosures), rev'd on other grounds 900 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir 1990)
(finding the material was exempt under the 7(D) exemption and not addressing 7(C) arguments).
But see Bast v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that mere
previous publicity in popular media cannot compel release).
1"
Karson Kampfe, Note, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability
Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1168 (2015) (examining the
context of police cases with body-worn cameras).
17
See N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
18s
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identities of the parties and allegations of the interaction are already
known. Therefore, a court should identify a strong privacy interest.
One might think that the victims of police misconduct would favor
the disclosure of the videos documenting their encounters with the
police.188 However, only the government can raise these interests in the
context of FOIA litigation. 189 As a result, the victim's privacy interests
will still likely play large roles in any litigation that arises. Favish's
determination that FOIA-related privacy interests include the
surviving family members of deceased subjects of a FOIA request could
lead to an interesting dynamic and provide the government more
opportunity to claim the existence of a privacy interest. 190 Videos of
police encounters, particularly where an individual is injured or killed,
can be extremely graphic. 19 1 A court, therefore, would identify a privacy
interest similar to that identified in Favish, where the family of the
deceased had a privacy interest in the graphic nature of suicide
photos.192
b. Public interest
Although there are strong privacy interests inherent in body-worn
camera videos, these are not insurmountable under the 7(C) balancing
test. The criminal context does not preclude public interests from
outweighing the privacy interests of both law enforcement agents and
victims of crime. 193 Here, courts will recognize that the release of bodyworn camera footage provides a particularly powerful public interest.

'
But see Gaynor Hall, Laquan McDonald's Family Does Not Want Police Shooting Video
Released, WGNTV (Nov. 20, 2015, 9:56 PM), http:I/wgntv.com/2015/11/20/laquan-mcdonaldsfamily-does-not-want-police-shooting-video-released
[https://perma.cc/QQK7-TVPD]
(reporting
that the family of Chicago police shooting victim Laquan McDonald "[did] not want the video

released because it would be too painful for their family and the community to watch over and over

again").
18
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979) (holding that "FOIA is purely a
disclosure statute and affords . . . no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure").
* Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165-67 (2004).
1
See, e.g., Police Cam Footage Released in Ohio Traffic Stop Shooting, ABC NEwS7 (Aug. 1,
2015), http: labc7news.com/news/police-body-cam-footage-released-in-ohio-traffic-stop-shooting/89
7814/ [https://perma.cc/X2GL-3T5S] [hereinafter Police Cam FootageReleased].
192 Favish, 541 U.S.
at 160.
'9 See, e.g., Butler v. Dep't of Justice, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994)
(noting that the strong public interest in seeing that due process rights are respected overwhelms
the reduced privacy interests of FBI agents as public officials).
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i. Police videos meet the "core purpose" test because they
depict "what the government is up to."
The biggest barrier to disclosure under 7(C) has been the "core
purpose" test's restriction of qualifying public interests. 9 4 Moreover,
since Favish, courts define the public interest that can be balanced
against any privacy interest in the challenged records even more
narrowly; it must specifically relate to the alleged government
misconduct. 195
A video of any police interaction, however, is an actual depiction of
"what [the] government's up to." 19 6 This differs greatly from the context
of Reporters Committee, where the disclosure request for an individual's
rap sheet "seeks no official information about a Government agency,
but merely records [what] the Government happens to be storing."1 97
The same critique can be applied to mug shots and autopsy
photographs. Conversely, body-worn camera videos would depict
"official action" of the police department. 198
In the context of alleged law enforcement violations, moreover,
courts have been particularly favorable to finding a strong public
interest in allegations of police misconduct. In Outlaw v. Department of
Army,1 99 the court ruled that Exemption 7(C) did not permit
withholding allegedly exculpatory photographs of a murder victim from
a requester who was convicted by court martial twenty-five years
earlier. 200 The court found that the "privacy interest is outweighed by
the public interest in the contribution to the administration of justice
by the Army that disclosure could effect [sic]. "201 "The public interest in
seeing that [the plaintiff's] due process rights are protected in his
criminal case is significant." 20 2 Given the numerous high-profile
examples of video evidence contradicting official police accounts of
shootings, courts are likely to find such a public interest in body-worn
camera videos. 203
194 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989); see also Halstuk & Davis, The PublicInterest Be Damned, supra note at 31, at 990.

"9

Favish, 541 U.S. at 175.

U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)
(quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
197 Id. at 780 (internal citation omitted).
196

198

Id. at 780.

199
200

815 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1993).
Id. at 506.

201

id.

202

Butler v. Dep't of Justice, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994).
See, e.g., John Kass, The Video That Might Rip ChicagoApart-And Why You Need To See

203
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ii. Requests to disclose videos would be supported by
evidence that overcomes the "presumption of legitimacy."
Even if this public interest is related to a claim that government
officials acted improperly in performing their duties, the requester
must produce "clear evidence" that would lead a "reasonable person" to
believe that the alleged government malfeasance might have
occurred. 204 A court following the D.C. Circuit's compelling evidence
test could erect an even higher barrier to disclosure. 205 Together these
create a Favish presumption of legitimacy in agency actions. 206
Nevertheless, body-worn camera videos would often meet each of
these tests. Typically, there is a specific reason or controversy that
prompts interest in a specific police interaction. 207 And usually this
specific interaction comes with additional evidence that suggests
possible misconduct-property damage, bodily injury, or specific
allegations from witnesses. 208 This will certainly be more than "bare
suspicion" of misconduct. 209 Accordingly, courts will determine that
body-worn camera videos both (1) relate to FOIA's "core purpose" of
uncovering government activity; and (2) could be accompanied by
"compelling evidence" that government malfeasance may have
occurred. Because this meets SafeCard's requirements, it cuts against
categorically exempting such videos from disclosure.
Police departments might still argue that the release of other
information that sheds light on the video's content reduces the public
interest in the release of the video itself. 210 Thus, law enforcement
would contend that courts should defer to the "presumption of

It, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2015), http:I#www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/kass/ct-policeshooting-video-kass-met-1111-20151110-column.html
[https://perma.cc/6QQJ-FPDS]
(official
police accounts described Laquan McDonald as "lunging" at police); Rolando Pujol, Police Report In
Eric Garner's Death Conflicts With Videos, PIXI
NEWS (July 31, 2014, 3:32 PM),
http://pix11.com/2014/07/31/exclusive-police-report-in-eric-garners-death-conflicts-with-videoswitnesses/ [https://perma.ccITEE2-RUCD] (while videos recorded Eric Garner telling police officers
"I can't breathe" eight times, the police report stated that Garner "did not appear to be in great
distress.").
204
Nat'1 Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).
205 SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197,
1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20
Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.
20'
Divine et al., supra note 18, at 3.
208 See, e.g., Police Cam Footage Released
supra note 191.
209
Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.
210
See Martin E. Halstuk, When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted Under the FOIA? An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's "Sufficient Reason" and "Presumptionof Legitimacy" Standards,
16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361, 394-95 (2005) (noting that "[T]he government can argue that an
asserted public interest has been served, or diminished, if an agency has already released a large
amount of information in response to a request.").
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legitimacy," and find that the balance categorically tips against
disclosure. 211 After examining the privacy interests of police officers,
however, this argument has already been addressed. 2 12 Video disclosure
implicates greater public interests than textual descriptions for similar
reasons that video disclosure implicates greater privacy interests than
textual descriptions-its clarity sets it apart. 213 Moreover, in a public
interest context, these arguments may be stronger. The videos provide
the more detailed depiction of "what the government is up to," and thus
directly relate to FOIA's core public interest.
It is important to note that while this might be encouraging for the
prospect of disclosing specific body-worn camera videos, its logic might
not necessarily apply equally to larger scale requests. For example,
larger investigations into department-wide misconduct might not have
that same "substantiated allegation" of misconduct. 214 Thus, this cuts
against the potential prospect of using police-worn body camera videos
as part of more exploratory efforts into police misconduct. Still, this
concern is not enough to exempt body-worn cameras categorically.
Requests for body-worn camera videos of discrete police encounters
could reasonably serve a substantial public interest, suggesting that
categorical exemptions under 7(C) are inappropriate.
Ad Hoc and In Camera Reviews Support the Public Interests of
Disclosure Without Eroding the Valid Interests the Law
Enforcement Exemption Protects

B.

In addition to the precedent supporting an ad hoc, case-by-case
analysis of body-worn camera videos, there are several normative
benefits that courts would lose if they categorically applied either
Exemption 7(A) or 7(C) to police body-worn camera videos. Primarily,
body-worn camera videos provide minimal public benefit if not
available for public viewing. But ad hoc reviews would also both
increase the credibility of the videos and more closely follow the spirit
of FOIA exemptions and amendments.

Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.
See Part IV.A.2.a, supra at 127.
213 Id.
214
Cameron T. Norris, Your Right to Look Like an Ugly Criminal: Resolving the Circuit Split
over Mug Shots and the Freedom of Information Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2013) (noting
that large-scale investigations are often frivolous or tangential to valid concerns).
21

212
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1. Body-worn cameras serve little public purpose unless their
footage is available to the public.
Most categories of public records serve legitimate purposes
regardless of whether they are disclosed to the public at large. 215 This is
evident even in a law enforcement context. Investigatory material, rap
sheets, and crime scene photos all serve key roles in law enforcement's
investigatory process. Police body-worn cameras, however, lose much of
their public purpose unless they are reasonably available to the public
at large. If one accepts that a main purpose of body-worn cameras is "to
strengthen
officer
performance . . .
and
to
enhance
agency
216
transparency[,J"
then it is incongruous to categorically exempt them
from disclosure.
Some could respond that even if disclosure is solely at the
discretion of the police, body-worn cameras still serve a valid purpose
"in improv[ing] evidence collection." 217 For example, they could simply
serve as evidentiary material, like any other security or dashboard
camera. 218 There are two problems with this. First, if body-worn
cameras are only used for evidentiary purposes, it likely increases the
critique that body-worn cameras are simply a part of a mass
surveillance system. 219 Second, most justifications for body-worn
cameras focus on their transparency benefits. Attorney General Loretta
Lynch declared that "[b]ody-worn cameras hold tremendous promise for
enhancing transparency, promoting accountability, and advancing
public safety for law enforcement officers and the communities they
serve[J" 2 2 0 In announcing that all Metropolitan Police officers would
wear body-worn cameras, Washington, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser
claimed that "[tihey increase accountability among all parties
involved." 221 These are only two examples of the near-identical
language with which elected officials describe body-worn cameras. At
least in their public justifications, policy makers do not intend bodyworn cameras to serve merely evidentiary purposes. If categorical
exemptions are applied to body-worn cameras, however, that will be
their only function.
215

Divine et al., supra note 18, at 6.

216

See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 10,
at 31.

217

id.

218

Id.

211

Stanley, supra note 17.

220

Berman, supra note 8.

221 All D.C. Patrol Officers to Get Body Cameras Under New Law, NBC WASH. (Dec. 30, 2015),
http://www.nbcwashington.com/blogs/first-read-dmv/DC-Mayor-to-Sign-Body-Cam-Bill-Into-Lawfor-Officers-363809871.html [https://perma.cc/C9YZ-864D].

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

904

[ 2016

2. Ad hoc reviews increase the credibility of body-worn cameras as
a resource.
Much of the justification for police body-worn cameras focuses on
their use in police brutality cases. 222 While they certainly can be used to
strengthen a claim against the police for unnecessary use of force, they
can just as well do the opposite. Among cases where parties use
videotape evidence, the officers were exonerated ninety-three percent of
the time. 2 2 3 Therefore, the use of body-worn cameras can be helpful in
generally determining the validity of complaints as well. 2 2 4
If police wish to take advantage of the evidentiary benefits that
body-worn cameras provide, however, they cannot be generally exempt
from public disclosure. 225 As several commentators have noted, "[i]f the
body cam footage is available to the public through straightforward
procedures, then police will be shielded from claims that the footage
they use defensively is deceptively edited or otherwise without
context." 226 Categorically exempting body-worn cameras would create a
regime governed by police discretion. Any oversight method in the
hands of those it is supposed to oversee would likely lose credibility.
3. Ad hoc reviews are an opportunity for courts to return to the
legislative spirit of the FOIA amendments.
The legislative history of the Law Enforcement Exemption offers
some support that agencies should make case-by-case determinations
when applying the law enforcement exemption. Prior to the 1974
amendments, Exemption 7 formerly referred to investigatory "files,"
rather than "records." 227 From that language, courts "had permitted
Exemption 7 to be applied whenever an agency could show that the
document sought was an investigatory file compiled for law
enforcement purposes." 228 Concerned "that agencies would use that rule

222
See, e.g., Peter Hermann & Rachel Weiner, Issues Over Police Shooting in Ferguson Lead
Push for Officers and Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/crime/issues-over-police-shooting-in-ferguson-lead-push-forofficers-and-body-cameras/
2014/12/02/dedcb2d8-7a58-11e4-84d4-7c896b9Oabdc-story.html [https://perma.cclMA4V-VYFC].
223 Te Impact of Video Evidence on Modern Policing, INT'L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 15

(2004).
224 David O'Reilly, Evesham Police Chief Calls Cameras a 'Game Changer', PHILA. INQUIRER
(Aug. 7, 2014), http: //articles.philly.com/2014-08-07/news/52519341_1_body-cameras-securitycamerasevesham-police-chief [https://perma.cc/Z7F9-Q5VA].
225
Divine et al., supra note 18, at 8.
226
Id.
227 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 156 (1989).
228

Id.
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to commingle otherwise nonexempt materials with exempt materials in
a law enforcement investigatory file and claim protection from
disclosure for all the contents," Congress changed the word "files" to
"records." 229 As a result, Exemption 7 requires the agency to
demonstrate that a particular record-not simply its overall file-was
"compiled for law enforcement purposes. "230
Commentators have argued that categorical exemptions clash with
the seemingly individualistic focus of the 1974 amendments, along with
FOIA's overall presumption of disclosure. 231 While the Supreme Court
has found otherwise, this does not mean that all records should have a
presumption of being categorically exempt. On the contrary, courts
should still consider this legislative intent within the standards of
categorical exemptions. As Part IV.A demonstrates, precedent suggests
that body-worn camera videos should not be categorically exempt. 2 32
With this in mind, reverting to the original legislative intent
additionally
supports rejecting the application of categorical
exemptions for body-worn cameras.
V. CONCLUSION
When a state decides to statutorily exempt body-worn camera
videos from the state's public records law, the legislature makes two
implicit assumptions. First, it assumes that FOIA precedent does not
support a judicial categorical exemption of police body-worn camera
videos. Second, it assumes that a categorical exemption is needed to
protect recognized state interests. As this Comment's analysis
demonstrates-using the federal model as an example-this legislature
is correct in its first assumption but wrong in the second.
It is first correct that existing FOIA precedent alone provides little
support for applying categorical exemptions to police body-worn
cameras. Categorical exemptions are a form of shorthand analysis,
applied when interests favoring disclosure are at their nadir and the
possibilities of interference and privacy violations are at their apex.
Body-worn camera videos do not present such a balance of interests. In
particular, the ability of body-worn cameras to literally show "what the
229

Id.

" Id.; see also Davin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1059-60 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]here
can be no question that the 7(C) balancing test must be conducted with regard to each document,
because the privacy interest and the interest of the public in disclosure may vary from document
to document."); Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 193 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding
that "[Tlhe FBI relied on an untenable position that once an investigation is justified, all
documents related to that investigation are eligible for exemption from FOIA.").
231
See Halstuk & Davis, The PublicInterest Be Damned, supra note 31, at 1002.
232
See supra Part IV.A.
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government is up to" creates a strong public interest favoring their
disclosure. 233 While the analysis demonstrates that Favish, Reporters
Committee, and Robbins Tire have each gradually expanded the
"narrow" reach of FOIA's Law Enforcement Exemption, 234 applying
categorical exemptions to body-worn camera videos is still outside this
reach.
The legislature errs, however, in its assumption that an ad hoc
analysis precludes the protection of legitimate state interests. The ad
hoc application of the Law Enforcement Exemption is a fact-intensive
analysis. There can be reasonable justifications for withholding bodyworn camera videos. And when those circumstances arise, courts can
effectively apply Exemptions 7(A) or 7(C) through an appropriate ad
hoc review of the videos' content. Public availability of the videos
certainly is consistent with the desire to increase police transparency
and public accountability. 2 35 But the fulfillment of these goals is not
paired with the complete abdication of privacy interests and the
integrity of law enforcement investigations. State legislatures should
recognize that these would still likely be accepted under existing
freedom of information frameworks. Transparency advocates should
make this clear. Otherwise, states may be prone to follow South
Carolina's example and inappropriately expand categorical exemptions.

233

See supra Part IV.A.2.b.

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that courts have "repeatedly
stated that these exemptions from disclosure must be construed narrowly, in such a way as to
234

provide maximum access").
235
See supra Part TV.B.1.

